Incentives, Information and Risk Taking：Evidence from
Banking Lending In China
地 点：中国人民大学 崇德西楼（原科研楼A座）815会议室
Following China’s entrance into the WTO, Chinese banks faced more competition from foreign financial institutions and the regulation authority (CBRC) strengthened risk regulation and supervision in commercial banks. These changes in market competition and regulation requirement offered plausibly exogenous shocks to the banking sector, and trigged a series of performance incentive policies on loan officers for many Chinese banks in order to improve competition and loan quality. This study aims to estimate the impact of performance incentives on risk-taking and lending decisions by employing a unique branch level dataset. We first show that performance incentives significantly decrease non-performing ratio (NPR), while explicit and implicate incentives, money and non-money based incentives generate different effects. Second, performance incentives lead to larger average loan size and lower origination to small and medium enterprises and credit loan, indicating more use of hard information and less of soft information in lending decisions. Third, performance incentives lead to shorter average loan maturity, indicating weaker motivation in risk-taking. Finally, effects of incentives varies according to the competitiveness of loan officers' salary, the internal communication cost and contract enforcement power. Our results highlight whether and how incentives affect risk-taking and information use
in bank lending.
苟琴，中央财经大学金融学院副教授，北京大学经济学博士，美国纽约大学访问学者。主要研究领域包括国际金融、宏观经济、实证银行经济等。研究成果发表于China Economic Review，European Journal of Finance, China & World Economy等国际期刊以及《管理世界》、《世界经济》及《金融研究》等中文期刊。研究成果获得《金融研究》年度优秀论文、澳大利亚中国经济学会年会（CESA）最佳论文、中国新兴经济体研究会优秀论文等学术奖项。